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Introduction 
Philip E. Steinberg 
In the weeks leading up to the 2016 US presidential election, Political Geography received 
two unsolicited guest editorials opining on the surging popularity of Donald Trump and, 
more broadly, the movement that he represented. In one editorial, Banu Gökariksel and Sara 
Smith associated the Trump phenomenon with the reassertion of a masculinist politics 
wherein the violent, white, male body is seen as the normative political figure. In the other, 
Sam Page and Jason Dittmer also focused on the embodied nature of Trump’s popularity, but 
they locate this in a complicated system in which oppositional tendencies also have 
momentum, and thus they end their editorial with a fairly optimistic assertion about the ways 
in which the openings made possible by Trump might lead to a counter-revolution of sorts, 
wherein the antinomies that increasingly characterise politics in the United States (and 
elsewhere) are overthrown. 
 After the election, we received two more unsolicited guest editorials reflecting on the 
topic. In one, Alan Ingram paired the Trump election with Brexit referendum that had been 
held five months earlier, and places both within an analytical framework inspired by the 
Deleuzian concept of the ‘machine’. In the second editorial, Natalie Koch took a step back 
from the election to avert her gaze away from Trump and toward the ways in which critical 
pundits and scholars were understanding Trump as bringing ‘authoritarianism’ to the United 
States. While Koch did not necessarily disagree with the analysis of Trump’s rule as 
‘authoritarian’ she noted how surprise about his popularity was rooted in a lingering 
American exceptionalism that clouded the analysis of the left and well as the right. 
 Now, in January 2018, we are one year into the Trump presidency, and a reassessment 
is in order. To that end, Political Geography has asked the authors of the four editorials to 
revisit their pieces from 2016 and 2017, and reflect on their thoughts, as well as the points 
raised in the first set of editorials by their colleagues. The reflections make for difficult 
reading. Gökariksel and Smith find that the masculinist politics identified in their 2016 
editorial has continued unabated. Koch locates her previous critique of American 
exceptionalism within a more thorough-reaching critique of American liberalism. Page and 
Dittmer acknowledge that they were wrong in predicting Trump’s defeat. Perhaps the most 
opstimistic contribution to this intervention set is by Ingram, who stresses that the damages 
done by populist movements in both the US and the UK have been limited by forces that 
limit their leaders’ efficacy. Even this, however, is but a partial victory. As Ingram concludes, 
“While it is welcome that worst case scenarios have so far been avoided, this is an inadequate 
critical or political standard.” The jury is out on whether Political Geography readers and 
authors can affect significant political change in a difficult intellectual environment. 
However, with (most likely) three more years to go in the Trump presidency, we hope that 
discussions like this one can help us develop critical and political standards that are adequate 
to the task. 
 
Mea culpa 
Sam Page and Jason Dittmer 
Boy, did we get it wrong. In our previous editorial (Page and Dittmer 2016) we asserted that 
Trump would not win the election. Other predictions – such as our hope that the rise and 
eventual fall of Trump would provide an opportunity to reconfigure the sclerotic political 
gridlock that has come to characterize U.S. politics – seem increasingly distant. In the first 
half of this commentary we revisit these claims, armed with both hindsight and knowledge of 
the 2017 Trump Administration, to see how racial affects help to explain Trump’s failure to 
dislodge the deadlock of U.S. politics. In the second half, we turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the ‘war machine’ (2004) to explain how Candidate Trump has struggled to 
perform as President Trump and to extract some hope for the future from the current crisis. 
 The first claim to revisit is our argument that the #NeverTrump movement (and 
related affects) would cut across and reconfigure the deep partisan divides that beset the 
United States. This has not occurred, or at least not to the extent we envisioned. Polls indicate 
that Trump maintains high levels of Republican support (in one poll in October 2017, it was 
down to 67% from 80% in March), and extremely low levels of support among Democrats 
(Hart 2017), as his administration replicates, and potentially advances, the politics of 
division.  
Thus, despite emphasizing the racist underpinnings of Trump’s candidacy, we 
underestimated the degree to which the Republican Party had become a proxy for white 
supremacy. In contrast, Smith and Gökariksel (2016, 80) foresaw the racist violence of the 
KKK and neo-Confederate groups’ Charlottesville uprising, as well as Trump’s intervention 
into the Kaepernick/Black Lives Matter protests, just to name two of Trump’s efforts to rub 
salt in the open wound of American racism:  
Trump is [a] revival of nationalist tendencies and white supremacy that is an integral 
part of US history through the erasure of native people, slavery, and the Jim Crow era, 
as well as through the scapegoating of Othered workers in the Chinese Exclusion Act 
and the paranoia of enemies within that led to the Japanese internment.  
 
Ta-Nehisi Coates (2017, np) takes this line of argument further, claiming that Trump is the 
‘first white president’, his presidency predicated on eradicating all evidence of the Obama 
years:  
To Trump, whiteness is neither notional nor symbolic but is the very core of his 
power. In this, Trump is not singular. But whereas his forebears carried whiteness like 
an ancestral talisman, Trump cracked the glowing amulet open, releasing its eldritch 
energies. 
 
Indeed, observation of Trump’s administration indicates how the populism embodied and 
performed is a specifically white populism. We anticipated that this would take the form of a 
dissonance machine, one that would increasingly alienate the majority of Americans. 
However, while ‘independent voters’ have largely turned against Trump (recent polls give 
him a 55% disapproval rate), elected Republicans have, for the most part, found a way to 
hitch their interests to the Trump machine despite the often-wide ideological gulf between 
them. As Coates (2017) says, not all Trump voters are white supremacists but they were all 
okay with casting a vote for one. The result is a Republican Party that has lined up behind a 
candidate espousing white supremacy, finally making overt a partisan divide on racial 
equality as a goal (rather than on the means of achieving it). 
 Our focus on Trump’s embodied performance has aged comparatively well because it 
frequently appears that he never stopped campaigning or started governing. We wrote then 
that, like many populist leaders, Trump simultaneously tries to embody both ordinariness and 
extraordinariness. He is a natural performer in this regard. Note the following, from an 
August 2017 Trump rally in Phoenix: 
Now, you know, I was a good student. I always hear about the elite. You know, the 
elite. They're elite? I went to better schools than they did. I was a better student than 
they were. I live in a bigger, more beautiful apartment, and I live in the White House, 
too, which is really great. (Time 2017, np) 
 
This quote, one of many such boasts, illustrates the simultaneous distancing-from and 
grasping-for elite status that underlies many of his political performances. In the following 
sentence he goes further: ‘I think – you know what? I think we’re the elites. They’re not the 
elites’ (Time 2017, np). In this one moment, he has explicitly recounted how he bears the 
markers of the elite (extraordinary) but is simultaneously not of them. Instead, he and the 
(ordinary) audience are the elite. Coates, again, sees Trump’s insecurity about status as core 
to his whiteness and populist affect: ‘It is as if the white tribe united in demonstration to say, 
“If a black man can be president, then any white man—no matter how fallen—can be 
president,”’ (Coates 2017, np). Trump’s fundamental ineptness, his moral, ethical, and 
political crassness, is key to the dynamics that maintain him as a subject within the complex 
assemblages of the U.S. state and the broader political field. It animates and enrages the 
opposition, which only affirms his supporters’ belief that he ‘speaks for them’ and that they 
have little in common with elites, liberals, Fake News, etc. Nevertheless, it does not hold that 
just because Trump has not yet driven ‘the affective politics of confrontation and division to a 
limit point in the US’ (Page and Dittmer 2016, 77) that he will not yet do so. Indeed, his 
fundamental ineptness indicates this potential. 
 In his editorial on issues of Atlanticism that arise from the events of Trump’s election 
and Brexit, Alan Ingram (2017: 92) argues that ‘In a number of ways, the new right war 
machine appears poised to rework the American state apparatus.’ Yet, the theory indicates 
that while it might do this there are also potential consequences for the war machine and its 
leader.  
The war machine is a particular understanding of relations of power between state and 
non-state bodies. The war machine is an always changing (becoming), rhizomatic, non-state 
assemblage that is at war with the state. The state, by contrast, has always existed: it came 
into being ‘quite perfect, quite complete’, and is ‘defined by the perpetuation or conservation 
of organs of power’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 418, 416). They are of different logics, and 
in the end the state will prevail, changing itself as well as the war machine as it consumes it. 
By again turning to Coates (2017, np), we can see the emergence of the war machine in 
Trump’s campaign: ‘Trump’s share of the white vote was similar to Mitt Romney’s in 2012. 
But […] Trump secured his support by running against his party’s leadership, against 
accepted campaign orthodoxy, and against all notions of decency.’ This has continued into 
his Presidency. 
 Instead of being driven by political ideology, the Trump assemblage territorializes 
around media spectacles and political ‘wins’. This produces a rhizomatic and unpredictable 
form, most clearly in the infamous 4am tweets that contradict official statements given in a 
press conference. Similarly, his comments about North Korea facing ‘fire and fury’, and a 
speech to NATO, were improvised (Zelney et al 2017; Shugerman 2017). Finally, Trump’s 
debt ceiling deal with the Democrats, after being snubbed by Congressional Republicans on 
health care, again, presents as a dissonance machine, as it reportedly shocked the GOP. 
 The struggle of the war machine to become the state is made apparent in the 
(in)stability of Trump’s administration. Deleuze and Guattari (2004, 413; their italics) 
emphasize that ‘The State has no war machine of its own; it can only appropriate one in the 
form of a military institution, one that will continually cause it problems.’ Trump’s 
administration struggles to pass laws, enforce Muslim bans, and staff the White House. At the 
time of writing, of the 601 government roles that require Senate confirmation, 302 had no 
appointee from the White House, including such crucial roles as the Ambassador to South 
Korea. Smith and Gould (2017, np) record that in the first seven months of his 
administration, ‘more than a dozen prominent executive branch employees were 
unexpectedly ousted, had to resign, or quickly change jobs.’ This includes the loss of both 
chief strategist Steve Bannon, and communications director Anthony Scaramucci, who lasted 
ten days in the job. 
 The war machine also emphasizes the inevitable victory of the state. In our last 
editorial, we pointed towards the evolution from Bush’s ‘evangelical-capitalist resonance 
machine’ (Connolly 2008) to what we termed the Trump white-male dissonance machine. It 
is now clear that Trump has brought the evangelicals into assemblage with the neo-Nazis. 
There are, however, cracks in the seams, as is evident in Trump’s uneasy relationship with 
capital, witnessed in the disbanding of the American Manufacturing Council in the aftermath 
of Trump’s reaction to the neo-Nazi murder in Charlottesville. 
This has some serious implications for how Trump’s presidency may play out, both in 
the immediate term, and the long run. Deleuze and Guattari (2004, 414-415; their emphasis) 
theorise that it is:  
the destiny of the war machine, when the State triumphs, to be caught in [an] 
alternative: either to be nothing more than the disciplined, military organ of the State 
apparatus, or to turn against itself, to become a double suicide machine for a solitary 
man or a solitary woman.  
 
This suggests some potential futures for both Trump and the US state. We may be seeing the 
Trump war machine being captured by the state, as Trump’s team accommodates to state 
procedures in order to get policies implemented. This may also mean that white supremacy 
becomes more acceptable in the day-to-day running of state. The ongoing electoral success of 
members advocating white supremacy does not seem far-fetched anymore when considering 
both recent domestic and international elections.  
Another prospect is the metaphorical suicide of Trump and the destruction of his war 
machine. This could take the form of Trump somehow settling down and becoming more 
statesman-like, however unlikely that seems. Or, the result of the war machine’s efforts could 
be the opposite of that to which they aspire, as their aggressive pursuit may still 
deterritorialise voters. Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 416) write that the war machine’s leader 
is ‘more like a leader or a star than a man of power and is always in danger of being 
disavowed, abandoned by his people’. This machine is not specifically wedded to Trump 
(Coppins 2017), and it may eventually turn its attention elsewhere, leaving Trump a mere 
‘solitary man’. Moreover, the machine itself has not yet become part of the state and it still 
may be destroyed: either by the state mechanisms, or by itself. After this year, if we have 
learned anything it is to be careful about predictions. 
 
Tiny hands, tiki torches: Embodied white male supremacy and its politics of exclusion  
Banu Gökariksel and Sara Smith 
Returning to our editorial on the rise of Trump from before the 2016 election is eerie. We 
saw in the rise of his embodied white masculinist performance a profound and dangerous 
threat: that Trump’s celebratory performance of white masculinity and his promises to Make 
America Great Again signaled an agenda that would reverse the gains women, non-whites, 
immigrants, Muslims, and LGBTQ activists had made towards social justice and inclusion. 
Building on feminist geopolitics that locates state-making and geopolitical strategy in the 
body and in intimate aspects of life (e.g. Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Fluri, 2009; Gökarıksel, 
2012; Massaro & Williams, 2013; Smith, 2011), we analyzed how Trump had made his own 
body and other bodies central to his campaign and politics. We were also concerned that such 
a performance would embolden white nationalists and strengthen the legacy of anti-Black 
racism, settler colonialism, and xenophobia on which the country was built. In the summer of 
2016, just before the election, we wrote:  
We see Trump’s rhetoric and performance of white masculinity as formative 
of a fascist body politics that seeks to preserve white male supremacy. Trump 
uses the gendered, racialized body as a proxy for the nation and locates threats 
to the nation in non-white and non-male bodies embodying deep-seated fears 
of ‘white decline’ and threatened borders (Gökarıksel & Smith, 2016, p. 79).  
 One year later a crowd of men in khaki pants and white polo shirts and wielding tiki 
torches descended on Charlottesville, Virginia. The scene managed to be deeply sickening 
and profoundly absurd. Their Nazi chants, “You will not replace us, Jews will not replace 
us,” put bluntly what the president hinted at in his persistent fearmongering on immigration, 
terrorism, and racial justice activism. The ostensible reason for the rally was to protest the 
planned removal of a statue in memory of the Confederate General Robert E. Lee from the 
grounds of the University of Virginia, and thereby to make a claim as to which America to 
remember and how to remember it. The organizers of the “Unite the Right” rally boasted that 
they had organized the largest white nationalist gathering in decades. The main organizer, 
Jason Kessler, dismissed Heather Heyer, the 31-year-old woman who was killed by a Nazi 
sympathizer who allegedly plowed a car into a group of counterprotesters, with a tweet (since 
deleted) that read “Heather Heyer was a fat, disgusting Communist. Communists have killed 
94 million. Looks like it was payback time,” which linked to a Daily Stormer article that 
disparaged Heyer (Phillips, 2017). This message resonates with the fear and hatred of 
women’s bodies in the flesh that Spackman (1996) and Theweleit (1987) have identified as 
an underlying theme in the development of fascist masculinities, and it echoes Trump’s well-
known strategy of discrediting women.  While this public show of power by Nazi 
sympathizers and KKK might be the most striking and disturbing confirmation that we were 
correct to be worried about emboldening white male nationalism, there are many other, 
perhaps less apparent ones as well.  
Reflecting back on our original editorial, we still find the deployment of feminist theories to 
be crucial in piecing together the unsurprising mystery of Trump’s election and the promise 
of an exclusionary body politics that set the stage for a scene of white masculine heroism: by 
gesticulating wildly toward all manner of threats (Muslim refugees! Mexican rapists! (Black) 
Thugs! Bleeding women!), he positioned himself as the embodiment of white masculine 
resurgence, enacted what Page and Dittmer (2016) have called a “white-male dissonance 
machine,” and blithely evaded the obvious questions: could a millionaire with a history of not 
paying workers save the (white) working class? In the year since, the dissonance has become 
only more uncanny as not only Trump but his entire family and team took the stage in epic 
performances of whiteness.  While Melania resentfully performed the sad captive queen, 
speaking out about bullying seemingly without irony (Thompson, 2017), Ivanka embraced a 
hyperwhite, class-oblivious, and depoliticized feminism-lite (Filipovic, 2017). Forming a 
cabinet that is reportedly the most white and male first cabinet since Reagan (Lee, 2017), the 
new president surrounded himself with a motley crew of white nationalists, most prominently 
Steve Bannon of Breitbart News (known for its conspiracy theories, fiery rhetoric, and a mix 
of populism, economic nationalism, anti-same-sex-marriage activism, and alt-right views) 
and Stephen Miller (who made a name for himself in his response to the 2006 Duke lacrosse-
team rape scandal (Cohan, 2017)), high ranking generals and top level executives cherry-
picked from the largest American companies (such as Rex Tillerson of Exxon-Mobil and 
Anthony Scaramucci of Goldman Sachs) along with seasoned politicians known for their 
conservatism, such as Jeff Sessions and Mike Pence. Trump immediately got to work. As if 
ticking off a checklist, he started to sign a series of executive orders, presidential memoranda, 
or proclamations that restrict the rights of women, Native Americans, immigrants, and 
Muslims, usually surrounded by a white male-dominated crowd that cheered him on.  
 Trump’s first action seemed like a direct response to thousands of women who had 
gathered in Washington DC and other cities across the world to protest his presidency the day 
after inauguration: a “global gag rule” on the discussion of abortion as a family planning 
option by US funded nongovernmental organizations working abroad (January 23), followed 
by continuing attempts to defund Planned Parenthood and a new rule that allows any 
employer to deny coverage of birth control (October 6) (Kodjak, 2017). Next were the 
approval of oil pipeline expansions that threaten Native American nations’ sovereignty and 
well-being (January 24), steps towards a concrete wall along US-Mexico border, forceful 
crackdown on “illegal” immigrants, a threat to withdraw federal funding from “sanctuary 
cities” (January 25), and finally, setting in motion the end of the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program that shielded from deportation undocumented immigrants who 
had been brought to the US as children (September 5). Trump signed a chaotic “Muslim ban” 
that barred or suspended travel and immigration originally from only Muslim-majority 
countries (January 27 and March 6). After multiple legal challenges and issues of stays by 
courts, the administration later revised this ban to cover citizens from Chad, Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Somalia, Syria and Yemen and some government officials from Venezuela 
(September 24). The White House turned its gaze on the military with a directive that banned 
transgender recruits, citing national security concerns (August 25). Undergirding this 
directive is the presumption that the qualities that the nation needs to be secure could exist 
only in CIS-gender bodies and that trans people not only do not have what it takes to protect 
the nation but they are a threat to the nation itself. When we approach these actions together, 
it becomes clear that they are part of an aggressively defensive strategy that aims to signal a 
strong position against perceived ‘white decline’ and to protect a threatened white hetero- and 
cis-masculinity. Elsewhere we have termed the feverish and fantastical renderings of 
demographic change “demographic fever dreams” (Smith 2017): such demographic fever 
dreams drive exclusionary body politics, stick in the mind, and generate affective and 
emotional responses precluding rational thought. Deportation, bans, walls, and internal 
violence—all measures of exclusion – seem to be justified for returning America to its 
supposed past greatness when it was crystal clear who was on top. Together they mark 
national territory as white, cis-male, and at least nominally Christian. 
 In our original editorial we argued that feminist theories of embodied politics were 
central to understanding the rise of Trump. With a year of hindsight, we stand by this 
assessment. In particular, we would like to stress two points.  
 First, Trump’s embrace of a particular pre-scripted and theatrical role as the 
(supposedly) straight-talking man with no patience for “political correctness,” and his rage at 
those who speak back to him (particularly women, people of color, and immigrants) is a 
means of embodying a revanchist white masculinity promising to set things right, to return to 
a supposed proper order. This is a form of embodied politics in which the individual anger 
and frustration of those who both are and feel disenfranchised can vest their hope in an 
authority figure who blames a catalogue of others (immigrants, Black people, women, 
transgender people) for their predicament and then takes action. The clearest demographic 
indicators of Trump support were whiteness across economic class, gender, and levels of 
education (Rogers, 2016; Tyson & Maniam, 2016). 
 Second, we want to reiterate our point that the flurry of anxiety, liberal panic, and 
other responses to Trump risk a revisionist history that sees Trump as an aberration or an 
unfortunate accident. This belies the ways that Trump is a more colorful example of the 
country’s foundations in exclusionary violence and the centering of heroic white masculinity 
(as savior to vulnerable and pure white femininity) as a means to write a script justifying 
conquest, exclusion, hardened borders, and gendered, racialized, and xenophobic policies. As 
Koch (2017, p. 145) writes, the  panic about “authoritarianism coming to America” from 
Africa, the Middle East, and other ‘backward’ places implies that “there [ever] was some 
more “pure” state of democracy that is presently under assault by Trump and his supporters.” 
There never was. As Anderson (2016) has eloquently argued, White Rage against the 
advancement of minorities, particularly Black people, has been a driving feature in the United 
States, however, it has usually operated quietly, through policies of school zoning, the war on 
drugs, and red-lining. Here, panic seems to emerge around the visibility of this rage, rather 
than on the tacit ways that it has been structuring our lives.  
 How to respond? As we have argued elsewhere (Gökarıksel & Smith, 2017), we 
applaud emergent coalitions of people of color, immigrants, and feminists taking an 
intersectional approach (and of course, these inadequate categories are too simplistic and also 
converge). We wish to warn against the kinds of smug comfort feminism (Silva, 2017) that 
papers over differences with a too-easy set of rhetorical moves. Cries that “we are all 
immigrants,” trans-phobic, pussy-centric calls to unity are now and have always been 
inadequate to deal with the very real, painful, and messy divides that we face.  
 Masha Gessen’s (2016) lessons on surviving in an autocracy provides helpful starting 
places, telling us to “believe the autocrat,” avoid new normalcies, maintain outrage, refuse to 
compromise, and remember the future. When Trump’s performances of white masculine 
power take center stage, this is an instance in which we ought to believe what he is telling us, 
and not view it as a distraction, but as a window into the policies unfurling and itself as a 
means of shifting politics and policies on the ground. By performing white masculinity as 
strongman autocrat, the policy has been made, and our politics of daily interaction have 
shifted. At the same time, we cannot allow ourselves to view this as an aberration, but rather 
as a newly strategized tactic that moves from tacit complicity into open avowal of white 
masculinity. The politics of liberal panic and shock signal that the best we can hope for is a 
return to the status quo (e.g., Obama’s era), and an affirmation that we were on the right path 
until the 2016 election took us on a sudden detour. This is a misunderstanding of history and 
the present. 
 A recent special issue in Gender, Place and Culture (Moss & Madrell, 2017) lays out 
many of the inherent complexities of this potential forward movement: that it might 
reinscribe hegemonic and CIS-gendered femininity (Boothroyd et al., 2017), or exclude 
women of color (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017), but might also enact new and 
promising forms of coalitional and agonistic politics (Moss & Madrell, 2017). There is the 
potential for a foundational break with status quo politics in this moment of heightened 
attention to historical inequities and the intersections of race, gender, and socioeconomic 
class in this country’s history and present. Where Trump’s exclusionary embodied politics 
has attempted to drive us toward fixed and hardened identities set in opposition, a feminist 
approach that understands our identities to be both rooted in experience but also contingent, 
relational, and possibly transformative can help forge a new path toward a politics based on 
an ethics of listening to each other and acting together.  
 
Brexit and Trump one year on: reterritorializing the West? 
Alan Ingram 
A year ago (Ingram 2017), I considered how the UK referendum result for ‘Brexit’, the 
election of Donald Trump as US President and the growing salience of fascist politics pointed 
towards a deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 2004) of Atlanticism and of the liberal 
idea of the West that emerged out of the Second World War. In this intervention, I reflect on 
subsequent events and the broader issues they raise, particularly in light of a series of further 
commentaries, reports and books by liberal writers, politicians and analysts contemplating the 
West’s actual or possible decline (e.g. Bunde et al. 2017; Emmott 2017; Garton Ash 2017; 
Luce 2017).  
Recent liberal accounts of the West have tended to be enunciated via reference to 
Enlightenment values, democracy and markets, the twentieth century defeat of fascism and 
communism and collective defence via the Atlanticist alliance between North America and 
Western Europe. Critical writers meanwhile have long highlighted how the liberal 
geopolitical idea of the West necessitates a correlative forgetting or disavowal of the episodes 
and forms of violence that have enabled it to come into being and which enable it to continue 
(e.g. Mazower 1999; Losurdo 2014). The movements for Brexit and for the election of 
Trump are radical not just in the way that they seek to undermine existing liberal institutions 
and norms, but also in terms of how they embrace forms of sovereignty, violence and 
domination that liberal accounts would disavow and critical ones challenge. Given the 
multiple ways in which the Brexit vote and election of Trump are intertwined, it is useful to 
consider them together. Linking them with liberal ideas of ‘the West’ and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ideas on fascism further offers a way of reflecting upon the dimensions and stakes 
of the current moment. 
During the US presidential election campaign, Trump alarmed alliance members by 
criticizing NATO (a central pillar of the West as geopolitical entity), declaring it to be 
obsolete and suggesting that the US would not necessarily come to the defence of members 
who, in his view, were not ‘paying their bills’, thus seeming to invalidate the organization’s 
main premise (Calamur 2016). In office, however, Trump has been forced to reverse his 
position, declaring, ‘I said it was obsolete; it’s no longer obsolete’ after a meeting with 
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (BBC News 2017). There has been no grand geopolitical 
bargain with Russia along the lines advocated by Trump advisers, and while, during the 
campaign Trump had floated the idea of an improved relationship with Russia, as President 
he has extended existing sanctions imposed in response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, 
and agreed to have his power to vary them reduced. Russian Prime Minister Dmitrii 
Medvedev subsequently wrote that ‘[t]he hope that our relations with the new American 
administration would improve is finished’ (Rampton and Zengerle 2017). 
The acceptance across the British political class of the Brexit vote as a legitimate 
expression of political will, meanwhile, appears to have had the effect of increasing the 
cohesion of the EU27 and strengthening its bargaining position, for the time being at least, 
while key Conservative Party supporters of Brexit, though they hold ministerial posts 
following the 2017 General Election, face opposition from colleagues and form part of a 
weak coalition government. Having called a snap election with the aim of increasing her 
majority and strengthening her ability to negotiate Brexit (which she had voted against) 
Prime Minister Theresa May in fact lost seats and was forced to conclude an unpopular 
coalition agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party. While the Labour Party is also split 
on Brexit and the party failed to win the election, it has undergone a revival under the 
leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, and the Conservative government is consequently less able to 
pursue the kinds of deregulationist policies favoured by Brexiteers. 
Just as Trump has proven himself utterly incapable of governing, the lack of 
substance, vision and strategy among leading Conservative Brexiteers has been starkly 
exposed. Though they would appear to have gained temporary control of the state, neither 
Trump nor the Brexiteers have yet been able to convert this into political success in terms of 
their most radical goals. Multiple investigations into Russian attempts to influence the 
presidential election and whether the Trump campaign assisted them, as well as into 
associated financial crimes, may further limit Trump’s room for manoeuvre and could 
conceivably still result in his departure from office (aspects of the Brexit campaign are also 
under investigation by the UK electoral commission). Republican figures reportedly 
anticipate reverses in the November 2018 mid-term elections and expect impeachment 
proceedings in the event of Democratic control of the House of Representatives (Murray 
2017). Apprehension of the scale of potential economic damage flowing from the prospect of 
Brexit may foster a situation in which it cannot proceed (Evans-Pritchard 2017). 
In late 2016 it appeared that the votes for Brexit and Trump might translate into a 
wave of success for far right parties across Western states, and debates on the nature of 
authoritarianism, totalitarianism and fascism have returned (e.g. Snyder 2017). But though 
the continued encroachment of far right parties and ideas into the political mainstream 
continues in a number of countries, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom failed to take power in 
the Netherlands general election and Marine le Pen failed to win the French presidential 
election. The statement by a le Pen advisor (Philipott 2016) on the evening of Trump’s 
victory that ‘[t]heir world is collapsing; ours is being built’ has failed to be borne out, so far 
at least. 
In their plateau on micropolitics and segmentarity, Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 229-
255) recognise that fascism needs to be analyzed on the ‘molecular’ level of individual and 
group desires as well as on the macropolitical level of political events, that certain kinds of 
machines could assemble fascist desires, and that danger grows when they begin to resonate 
together. As they argue, fascism should be understood in terms of an orientation towards 
destruction, abolition, nihilism and suicide; fascism points towards absolute 
deterritorialization. Yet they also ask, ‘[h]ow could movements of deterritorialization and 
processes of reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 11)’? While growing resonances across the various outgrowths 
of the fascist rhizome may have been dampened  deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
are neither symmetrical nor dialectically related, nor does their inter-relation result in 
synthesis: things may break out into transformative events at any moment.  
While we might highlight the ways in which both Trump and Brexit have encountered 
limits and elicited opposition, then, there are serious grounds to question the optimism of one 
prominent liberal commentator, who wrote: 
[s]o long as Trump does not go to war with North Korea, or some equivalent folly, the 
United States could yet emerge from four years of a ghastly presidency with both its 
democracy and its international reputation battered, but not damaged beyond repair. 
British democracy too is working in its funny old parliamentary way, producing a real 
chance that we Brits can recover in time from the madness of the thing, to make either 
a very soft Brexit or – as we should – an exit from Brexit. (Garton Ash 2017) 
First, as far as Trump is concerned, although a tight circle of advisers apparently strive to 
manage his behaviour on a daily basis, and while diplomacy apparently continues with North 
Korea, the fact that the key positions of Chief of Staff, National Security Adviser and 
Secretary of Defense are held by retired or serving generals highlights the renewed 
militarization of government at the highest levels at a time when overseas military strikes and 
deployments are being significantly expanded with little scrutiny, and while diplomacy has 
been eviscerated. Second, Trump also continues to represent, endorse and enact white 
supremacism and a toxic form of masculinity, equivocating over white supremacist violence 
and offering disproportionate criticism of black people and women, fuelled, apparently, by a 
compulsion to negate the record of his black predecessor (Coates 2017). Third, further light 
has been thrown on the ways in which political technologies developed in counter-insurgency 
and propaganda campaigns outside the West were used in concert with new data sciences and 
the exploitation of social media platforms to influence both votes (Cadwalladr 2017). While 
the British Labour Party made far better use of social media than the Conservatives in the 
2017 British general election, and although manipulation of public discourse and sentiment is 
by no means absent from the political history of the West, the cutting-edge propaganda 
technologies that are at the disposal of unaccountable billionaires and closely affiliated with 
military and intelligence interests raise fundamental new questions for the idea of a 
democratic public sphere. Fourth, myriad scandals have further revealed the extent to which 
the super-rich and their offspring, in the US and well beyond, have been able to create wide 
legal and behavioural latitude for themselves through an array of lawyers, fixers and 
functionaries and the use of offshore jurisdictions. 
While it is welcome that worst case scenarios have so far been avoided, this is an 
inadequate critical or political standard. Brexit and the Trump presidency have been 
accompanied by an intensification of the social and political warfare that already harms 
millions of people on a daily basis and which will continue even if they are curtailed, 
something that liberal commentators tend to recognise only fleetingly. 
 
Trump, 1 year later: Three myths of liberalism exposed 
Natalie Koch 
In writing my commentary for Political Geography earlier this year (Koch, 2017), I sought to 
critique the script about “authoritarianism coming to America,” which proliferated during 
Donald Trump’s candidacy and his subsequent election. I argued that by treating 
authoritarianism as foreign to American political practice – and soil – this script is best 
understood as a geopolitical identity narrative reinforcing the myth of American 
exceptionalism. The notion that the United States possesses exemplary liberal credentials is a 
nationalist vision, less fact than aspirational fiction about who “we” are and what “we” 
should value as US citizens. The othering of authoritarian practice is fundamental to this 
nationalist vision, premised on the ideals of liberalism. These ideals have been challenged in 
new and striking ways since Trump has haphazardly tried to assume the presidential helm. 
Indeed, these challenges have left many of America’s devout liberals thoroughly bewildered. 
In this short contribution, I want to suggest that this bewilderment is the result of a systematic 
failure of America’s left to understand liberal ideology as ideology. To illustrate, I will 
consider three fundamental myths of liberalism, which many in the US have (mis)taken for 
basic truths. The myths themselves are not new, but they are central to liberal ideology. What 
is new is the scope, intensity, and public nature with which they have been exposed on the 
national stage. 
 The first myth of liberalism recently laid bare in US public discourse is that liberal 
subjects are rational subjects. With early roots in a form of laissez-faire economic logic 
applied to political systems, liberalism has always been tied to the idealized notion of a 
rational subject acting in his or her “interest.” Michel Foucault (2008) traces the rise and 
spread of this governmental logic in The Birth of Biopolitics, arguing that what characterizes 
liberal rationality is how to model government “on the rational behavior of those who are 
governed” (p. 312). Instead of seeking governmental legitimacy in a truth-claim, such as 
divine right, liberal ideology takes a different tack: “That is to say, one no longer tries to peg 
government to the truth; one tries to peg government to rationality” (Foucault, 2008, p. 311). 
This history is significant because the idea of a rational actor is so thoroughly taken for 
granted by liberals today that it is hard for most to conceive of it as a social construction, let 
alone a tool of government.  
The liberal romance for rational subjects has been profoundly shaken by the apparent 
crisis of liberalism unfolding in the United States (among other avowedly liberal countries of 
the world). Rationality itself has been publicly called into question as Trump and his 
supporters (as well as a slew of other groups pre-dating his rise) have so openly and brazenly 
assaulted the tenets of science-based reasoning. Exemplified in rhetorical claims to 
“alternative facts,” the xenophobic fantasies conjured by white supremacists at the 
Charlottesville protests, and the non-stop vitriol espoused by right-wing opinionators and 
their social media devotees and bots alike, US liberals have been s tunned by the fact that their 
compatriots so obviously lack a commitment to truth, reason, or utilitarian ideals – a 
commitment many naively thought was shared by all American citizens. Yet as I have long 
noticed in watching the right-wing media permeate the televisions and radios of members of 
my own family, beginning with the rise of Fox News in the late 1990s, these outlets have 
always appealed to emotion, rather than reason. Diverse as these groups may be, they share 
no romance for rational subjects. 
Cultivating anti-rationalist subjects is much older than Fox News and its social media-
based progeny; it is a staple of illiberal government. Similarly, nationalisms and many other 
political identity narratives have a long history of appealing to emotion rather than reason. In 
his effort to define some of the main elements of a generalized “ur- fascism,” Umberto Eco 
(1995) explains that such cases of irrationalism depend on “the cult of action for action’s 
sake. Action being beautiful in itself, it must be taken before, or without, any previous 
reflection. Thinking is a form of emasculation.” For American liberals who truly value reason 
– and thinking! – what they are now experiencing is not an objective political crisis as such, 
but an ideological crisis whereby the foundational tenet of all citizens being rational actors 
has been challenged. Yet many critics on the left seem to be woefully unaware of the extent 
of the problem, of the fundamentally mythical nature of people being a priori rational 
subjects. This is especially apparent in the fact that liberal responses to the hate provoked by 
Trump and his followers nonetheless consistently appeal to truth, reason, and utilitarianism. 
Liberals look on in disbelief as their responses to the president’s lies and spiteful politics fall 
on deaf ears. Again based on my own experiences of dealing with individuals afflicted by this 
rhetoric, one cannot argue with emotion – let alone when a common commitment to reason-
based argumentation is absent.  
Since Trump’s inauguration, this challenge has become more apparent to liberal 
critics, who are starting to recognize the liberal myth of rational subjects for what it is. I 
suspect that this shift is only partly precipitated by current political affairs in the wake of 
Trump’s election, but also reflects a generational shift. Contemporary liberal ideology in the 
US is largely tied to post-World War II identity narratives of American exceptionalism. Since 
that time, political commentators and ordinary citizens alike have mistaken the hegemony of 
liberal ideology for the actual reach of citizens’ commitment to its tenets and values. Yet the 
apparent hegemony of reason-based and utilitarian civic norms in the world’s “liberal 
democracies” are exactly that: apparent. As I suggested in my previous commentary, “we” 
have never been so liberal. The exposure of liberalism’s myth of rationality has unsettled 
many people in the United States – and rightly so. But where does this leave us? Is the liberal 
fantasy of the rational actor bound to be illusory? I would suggest that the issue is more a 
problem of being able to recognize political ideology for what it is: governing through reason 
is an aspirational discourse that is the engine of liberalism’s telos. This means that if liberals 
want their political project to succeed, they must work to craft rational subjects, rather than 
assuming them to be the natural product of America’s (fictively “exceptional”) social and 
political milieu.  
This leads me to the second myth of liberalism that has been publicly exposed since 
Trump’s rise: that limits on freedom are attacks on liberalism. In theorizing liberalism, 
Foucault (2008) defines it as a governmental logic that works through freedom. Like its 
quintessential rational subjects, liberalism must a lso manufacture these freedoms. They do 
not exist in some natural state to be harnessed by governments. This means that liberal 
ideology is not the acceptance of freedom, but rather a producer of freedoms (Foucault, 2008, 
p. 65). Once conjured, these freedoms become liberalism’s raison d’être, as they need to be 
managed and organized – as do “the conditions in which one can be free” (Foucault, 2008, p. 
64). The paradoxical result is that “at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different 
and mobile problematic relationship between the production of freedom and that which in the 
production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it” (Foucault, 2008, p. 64). In brief, acts 
of (de)limiting certain freedoms are not attacks on liberalism, but are foundational to the very 
nature of liberal ideology. This is important because many people imagine liberalism to exist 
in some abstract “marketplace of ideas,” in competition with other ideologies like 
communism or fascism, which are butting up against and threatening its freedoms. Rather, 
the vision of freedom under siege is internal to liberalism: it is its motivating drama. 
This theoretical starting point helps to explain why so many on America’s left are 
now finding themselves in the uncomfortable position of advocating restrictions on certain 
freedoms. In response to the onslaught of hate speech launched to a new level by Trump’s 
demagoguery, combined with actual and latent violence (both resulting from and preceding 
his presidency), many Americans are increasingly prepared to impose restrictions on various 
forms of free speech. As Timur Kuran (1995) shows in his foundationa l book on preference 
falsification, to allow complete freedom of expression would require “exemplary tolerance,” 
which is when: 
no one would ever seek punitive actions against others for their political 
views. By this account, to show tolerance is to object to an idea about 
objecting to its expression. […] Perfectly tolerant individuals would not even 
frown at a speaker promoting the most repulsive ideas. They might, of course, 
express reservations and offer alternatives. Tolerance is not apathy, 
indifference, or diffidence. What it requires is acceptance of the principle that 
no political end, however noble, justifies the suppression of an idea. (Kuran 
1995, 97) 
 
Although many Americans like to believe the nationalist script about the country’s 
exceptional track-record for promoting free speech, it does not imply that citizens are actually 
committed to any form of “exemplary tolerance.” As Kuran argues, and as many other social 
scientists confirm, even in liberal democratic states, few people “are perfectly tolerant. Most 
people exhibit a readiness to censor views that are unexceptional even within their own 
communities” (Kuran, 1995, p. 97). While I like to think of myself as an advocate of 
tolerance, I am acutely aware of the social and political risks of a llowing forms of hate 
speech, fear-mongering, and barefaced lies to go unchecked. So, again, where does this leave 
us?  
If we take seriously Foucault’s argument about the liberal art of government as 
manufacturing, managing, and organizing freedom, the myth that limits on freedom are 
attacks on liberalism becomes easier to expose. Limiting free speech, for example in the form 
of removing racist- inspired statuary or refusing to permit a white-supremacist rally, is not 
anti- liberal. Debating how, when, where,  and for whom certain freedoms can be enjoyed, as I 
have already noted, is the very raison d’être of liberalism. Furthermore, as Kuran argues, 
because of the diffuse forces of social stigma, there is nothing essential to liberal democracy 
that prevents individuals from being penalized for advocating certain ideas. What sets liberal 
regimes apart from illiberal regimes is instead that the former simply tend to restrict “the 
menu of possible penalties” (Kuran, 1995, p. 85). Whereas nondemocratic regimes usually 
have recourse to physical, economic, and social penalties, liberal regimes “worthy of the 
name” tend to restrict the scope of such sanctions for those expressing radical ideas (Kuran, 
1995, p. 85). However configured in practice, this is to suggest that  there is an important 
difference between a government that limits forms of public expression and one that punishes 
it.  
Finally, the third myth of liberalism that has been shaken to its core since the 
beginning of the Trump administration is that being politically engaged is not only the duty of 
liberal subjects, but the apex of their self-fulfillment. Arguably more so than the right, the left 
in America has a long-running romance with political engagement that constantly affirms this 
ideal. I have often found this perplexing because the left tends to be far more attuned to the 
challenges of those deprived of financial and social resources. And as many on the left are 
well aware – and perhaps more so today than in the recent past – doing activist work 
demands substantial time and financial resources that puts it out of reach for many. Being 
politically engaged and informed is also emotionally taxing. Many in the US who consider 
themselves to be good liberal subjects may have been loosely aware of this before the Trump 
presidency, but have since been hit with the full force of emotional exhaustion in simply 
trying to keep up with the day’s news and each new crisis. 
This calculated chaos may be one of the Trump administration’s few strategic 
“successes” thus far – not only has it kept the left in a constant state of apoplexy (to the 
delight of that amorphous creature, the Trump Base), but it has riddled them with tremendous 
guilt. This guilt is a liberal guilt. It is rooted in liberalism’s idealization o f the informed and 
engaged citizen who should derive fulfillment, if not pleasure, from assuming this subject 
position. Lacking the time and emotional resources to keep up with every new political 
onslaught, many critically-minded Americans feel demoralized and personally ashamed for 
not being able to do more, for not being “sufficiently” politically engaged. The problem is an 
old one, of course (as most are). In any political system, liberal or otherwise, public discourse 
is always limited: “An infinite number of human concerns are candidates for becoming 
political issues. A small minority actually do. Political discourse focuses on a few concerns at 
a time, treating the rest as nonissues” (Kuran, 1995, p. 46; see also Schattschneider, 1960).  
Political theorists have long stressed the importance of setting the political playing 
field – what does or does not become a political issue – but the challenge today is that as 
people become more globally networked, “this rise in social interdependence has not been 
matched by a commensurate improvement in our cognitive faculties” (Kuran, 1995, p. 98). 
Many Americans today may have broader awareness of various political issues thanks to 
internet resources and social media platforms, but this does not mean that people a re better 
equipped to process everything that is theoretically only one click away – let alone act on it. 
In the mainstream public discourse, US liberals have thus tended to focus on a select set of 
issues. But since Trump has come to office, they have found that their capacity to engage on 
all their important causes has been completely obliterated. Of course, many people are still 
energized to fight back, but others are increasingly finding themselves in the same situation 
as many citizens in authoritarian regimes – where political withdrawal becomes a coping 
strategy. This too brings along another layer of liberal guilt, insofar as people feel that they 
are shirking their civic duty, even if it is a very immediate (and, dare I say, rational) response 
to prioritizing one’s mental health, wellbeing, and personal commitments.  
I have observed this logic of self-preservation in diverse authoritarian states, which I 
have studied over the years. The people I have encountered in places like Kazakhstan, the 
UAE, or Russia are well aware that selective political engagement is just as powerful as (if 
not more powerful than) trying to turn oneself into the archetype of the hyper-engaged, 
thoroughly- informed liberal subject. For them, this can often be quite dangerous, but 
ultimately, I believe it is more an issue of practicality: everyone has limited resources to 
engage and they must carefully consider the trade-offs to be made. This realization is starting 
to come to America. As those on the left have personally encountered the challenges of their 
romance for political engagement, there is an increasing space for individuals to accept that 
being a “good citizen” requires critically assessing where one’s actions can actually be 
impactful. Centrally, this is not just a question of the topical scope of one’s activism, but one 
with a different temporal horizon for differently-positioned individuals. Although every new 
headline appears to be a crisis, the narrative of urgency brings us perilously close to the 
fascist “cult of action for action’s sake” (Eco, 1995). If liberal ideology is to prevail in the 
United States, resisting this liberal guilt and thinking strategically may well be the most 
important tasks ahead. 
 References 
Anderson, C. (2016). White rage: The unspoken truth of our racial divide. New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing. 
BBC News. 2016. Nigel Farage calls US President Barack Obama a ‘loathsome individual’. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37934790 [Accessed October 19, 2017]. 
BBC News. 2017. Trump says NATO ‘no longer obsolete’. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39585029 [Accessed October 20, 2017]. 
Boothroyd, S., Bowen, R., Cattermole, A., Chang-Swanson, K., Daltrop, H., Dwyer, S., … 
Yoon-Potkins, Q. (2017). (Re)producing feminine bodies: emergent spaces through 
contestation in the Women’s March on Washington. Gender, Place & Culture, 24(5), 
711–721. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2017.1339673 
Bunde, T., Franke, B., Maderspacher, Q., Oroz., A., Schwemer, L., Ullrich, L., Werner, L., 
Wittek, K. 2017. Munich Security Report 2017: Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order? 
Munich Security Conference Foundation: Munich. 
Cadwalladr, C. 2017. The great British Brexit robbery: how our democracy was hijacked. 
The Observer. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-
robbery-hijacked-democracy [accessed October 19, 2017]. 
Calamur, K. (2016) NATO Shmato? The Atlantic. Available at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/trump-nato/492341/ [Accessed 
October 19, 2017]. 
Cillizza, A. by C. C., CNN. (2017, September 15). Trump’s latest post-London tweet storm 
didn’t wait for the facts. Retrieved October 19, 2017, from 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/15/politics/trump-london-attack/index.html 
Coates, T-N. (2017) “The First White President,” The Atlantic 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-white-president-ta-
nehisi-coates/537909/ (last accessed 1 October 2017). 
Cohan, W. D. (2017, May 30). How Stephen Miller rode white rage from Duke’s campus to 
Trump. Vanity Fair. 
Coppins, Mckay. 2017. ‘Nobody’s in Control’. The Atlantic. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/nobodys- in-control/541650/ 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. 2004. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. B. Massumi. London: Continuum. 
Dowler, L., & Sharp, J. (2001). A feminist geopolitics? Space & Polity, 5, 165–176. 
Eco, U. 1995. Ur-Facism. The New York Review of Books. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/06/22/ur-fascism/  
Emmott, B. 2017. The Fate of the West: The Battle to Save the World’s Most Successful 
Political Idea. The Economist Books. 
Evans-Pritchard, A. 2017. Britain’s missing billions: revised figures reveal UK is £490bn 
poorer than previously thought. The Telegraph. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/10/15/britains-missing-billions-revised-
figures-reveal-uk-490bn-poorer/ [Accessed October 19, 2017]. 
Filipovic, J. (2017, January 13). Ivanka Trump’s Dangerous Fake Feminism. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/opinion/sunday/ivanka-
trumps-dangerous-fake-feminism.html 
Fluri, J. (2009). Geopolitics of gender and violence ‘from below.’ Political Geography, 28(4), 
259–265. 
Foucault, M. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979. 
New York: Picador. 
Garton Ash, T. 2017. After Trump and Brexit, is this the end for the Anglo-Saxon West? 
theguardian. Available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/28/trump-brexit-end-of-west 
[Accessed October 19, 2017). 
Gessen, M. (2016, November 10). Autocracy: Rules for Survival. The New York Review of 
Books. Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/11/10/trump-election-
autocracy-rules-for-survival/ 
Gökarıksel, B. (2012). The intimate politics of secularism and the headscarf: the mall, the 
neighborhood, and the public square in Istanbul. Gender, Place & Culture, 19(1), 1–
20. 
Gökarıksel, B., & Smith, S. (2016). “Making America great again”?: The fascist body politics 
of Donald Trump. Political Geography, (54), 79–81. 
Gökarıksel, B., & Smith, S. (2017). Intersectional feminism beyond U.S. flag hijab and pussy 
hats in Trump’s America. Gender, Place & Culture, 24(5), 628–644.  
Hart, B. 2017. ‘Poll Show Trump Dipping to 32 Percent Approval’. New York. 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/10/poll-shows-trump-dipping-to-32-
percent-approval.html (last accessed 09/10/2017).  
Ingram, A. (2016) “Geopolitical events and fascist machines: Trump, Brexit, and the 
deterritorialisation of the West,’ Political Geography 57: 91-93 
Ingram A. 2017. Geopolitcial events and fascist machines: Trump, Brexit and the 
deterritorialisation of the West. Political Geography 57, 91-93. 
Koch, N. (2017). Orientalizing authoritarianism: Narrating US exceptionalism in popular 
reactions to the Trump election and presidency. Political Geography, 58, 145–147. 
Kodjak, A. (2017). Trump guts requirement that employer health plans pay for birth control. 
NPR, 6 October. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2017/10/06/555970210/trump-ends-requirement-that-employer-health-plans-
pay-for-birth-control 
Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference 
falsification. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lee, J. C. (2017, March 10). Trump’s Cabinet So Far Is More White and Male Than Any 
First Cabinet Since Reagan’s. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/13/us/politics/trump-cabinet-women-
minorities.html 
Losurdo, D. 2014. Liberalism: A Counter-History. London: Verso. 
Luce, E. 2017. The Retreat of Western Liberalism. Atlantic Monthly Press. 
Massaro, V. A., & Williams, J. (2013). Feminist geopolitics. Geography Compass, 7(8), 567–
577. 
Mazower, M. 1999. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. London: Penguin. 
Moss, P. and Maddrell, A., (2017). Emergent and divergent spaces in the Women’s March: 
the challenges of intersectionality and inclusion. Gender, Place and Culture. 613-620. 
Murray, S. 2017. Trump allies worry that losing the House means impeachment. CNN 
Politics. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/16/politics/democrats-house-
midterm-elections/index.html [Accessed October 20, 2017]. 
Page, S. and Dittmer, J. (2016) “Donald Trump and the white-male dissonance machine,” 
Political Geography 54: 76-78. 
Philipott, F. 2016. Leur monde s’effondre. Le notre se construit. Available at: 
https://twitter.com/f_philippot/status/796236993172766720 (Accessed October 19, 
2017). 
Phillips, K. (2017, August 22). The man who organized the Charlottesville rally is in hiding 
— and too toxic for the alt-right. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/08/22/the-man-who-
organized-the-charlottesville-rally-is-in-hiding-and-too-toxic-for-the-alt-
right/?utm_term=.a474cefc8ecb 
Rampton, R. and Zengerle, P. 2017. Trump signs Russia sanctions bill; Moscow calls it ‘trade 
war’. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
russia/trump-signs-russia-sanctions-bill-moscow-calls- it-trade-war- idUSKBN1AI1Y4 
[Accessed October 20, 2017]. 
Rogers, K. (2016, November 9). White Women Helped Elect Donald Trump. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/politics/white-
women-helped-elect-donald-trump.html 
Rose-Redwood, C., & Rose-Redwood, R. (2017). ‘It definitely felt very white’: race, gender, 
and the performative politics of assembly at the Women’s March in Victoria, British 
Columbia. Gender, Place & Culture, 24(5), 645–654.  
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist’s view of democracy in 
America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Shugerman, E. 2017. “Donald Trump improvised Nato speech and shocked national security 
team by removing Article 5 support.” 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-nato-speech-
improvised-article-5-removal-national-security-team-a7774036.html 
Silva, K. (2017, May). Panel Remarks. Presented at the Feminist Geography 2017, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
Smith, A and S Gould. 2017. ‘Here are all the firings, resignations, departures, and job 
changes from the first chaotic 8 months of the Trump administration.’ Business 
Insider UK http://uk.businessinsider.com/trump-fires-resigns- leaves-administration-
2017-7 
Smith, S. (2011). “She says herself, ‘I have no future’”: Love, fate, and territory in Leh 
District, India. Gender, Place and Culture, 18(4), 455–476. 
Smith, S. (2017). Demographic fantasies and fever dreams: populism and panic. Paper 
presented at the annual conference of the Royal Geographical Society, London, 
September. 
Smith, S. and Gökariksel, B. (2016) “’Making America great again’?: The fascist body 
politics of Donald Trump,” Political Geography 54: 79-81. 
Snyder, T. 2017. On Tyranny: Lessons from the Twentieth Century. London: The Bodley 
Head. 
Spackman, B. (1996). Fascist virilities: rhetoric, ideology, and social fantasy in Italy. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Theweleit, K. (1987). Male Fantasies: Women, floods, bodies, history (Vol. 1). Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Thompson, K. (2017, September 20). Melania Trump condemns bullying — and raises some 
eyebrows — in her first U.N. speech. The Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/melania-trump-condemns-bullying--
and-raises-some-eyebrows--in-her-first-un-speech/2017/09/20/9973d77a-9e1e-11e7-
8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html 
Time Magazine (2017) ‘President Trump ranted for 77 minutes in Phoenix. Here’s what he 
said.’ Time http://time.com/4912055/donald-trump-phoenix-arizona-transcript/ (last 
access 4 October 2017) 
Tyson, A., & Maniam, S. (2016, November 9). Behind Trump’s victory: Divisions by race, 
gender, education. Retrieved October 19, 2017, from 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-
by-race-gender-education/ 
Zeleny, J, D Merica, K Liptak. 2017. ‘Trump’s “Fire and Fury” remark was improvised but 
familiar’. CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/09/politics/trump-fire- fury- improvise-
north-korea/index.html 
 
